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"WILLFUL BLINDNESS": A BETTER DOCTRINE FOR
HOLDING CORPORATE OFFICERS CRIMINALLY
RESPONSIBLE FOR RCRA VIOLATIONS
INTRODUCTION
In 1976, Congress enacted the Resource Conservation and Recov-
ery Act (RCRA)' in response to the serious threat to human health
and the environment posed by the several million tons of hazardous
waste that were literally dumped on the ground each year.2 React-
ing to growing concerns that waste disposal practices were still out
of control,3 Congress, in 1980, amended RCRA to include criminal
enforcement provisions that imposed stiff felony sanctions.' Today,
in addition to enormous fines, these sanctions include imprisonment
for up to five years,5 or fifteen years if the violator knowingly placed
another person in imminent danger of death or serious bodily
injury.
Under the amended RCRA criminal provisions and other environ-
mental statutes, the federal government is prosecuting polluters with
increased frequency and vigor.' The Justice Department has
claimed that the "increased commitment of resources to environ-
mental criminal enforcement [would] continue in 1991 and beyond
as a potent and productive legal force standing guard over our envi-
ronment." This increased commitment was also spurred by the en-
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6902 (1988).
2. HR. REP. No. 1491, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N 6238,
6249 (stating that RCRA was enacted to provide "a multifaceted approach for solving the
problems associated with the 3 to 4 billion tons of discarded materials generated each year, and
the problems resulting from the anticipated 8% increase in the volume of such waste).
3. See Christopher Harris et al., Criminal Liability for Violations of Federal Hazardous
Waste Law: The 'Knowledge' of Corporations and Their Executives, 23 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
203, 205-07 (1988) (stating that the public perceived the threat of harms as "real and
imminent").
4. Id. at 206-07.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d) (1988).
6. Id. § 6928(e).
7. See generally Dick Thornburgh, Criminal Enforcement of Environmental Laws - A Na-
tional Priority, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 775 (1991) (stating that the Department of Justice's
budget for enforcing environmental crimes has increased ten-fold since 1983).
8. Id. at 779.
1461
DEPA UL LA W RE VIE W [Vol. 42:1461
actment of the Pollution Prosecution Act of 1992,' which provides
for an increase in the number of criminal investigators to two hun-
dred by 1995, more than triple the number required in 1992.0
Many of these criminal prosecutions will continue to be directed
towards corporate officers because they have primary decisionmak-
ing authority and the deterrent function that is the goal of environ-
mental criminal enforcement is better served by actions against
them.11 To convict a corporate officer under RCRA, the government
must prove that the crime was committed "knowingly." 12 Prosecu-
tors contend, however, that proving upper-level employees possess
actual knowledge of RCRA violations is difficult because they can
shield themselves from liability by delegating "hands-on" responsi-
bilities to subordinates. 8
For this reason, prosecutors support the use of certain judicial
doctrines, conceived in criminal jurisprudence, which allow the trier-
of-fact to infer a defendant's knowledge based on circumstantial evi-
dence.1 4 The federal government has attempted to utilize two such
doctrines under RCRA, the responsible corporate officer (RCO)
doctrine and the willful blindness doctrine." The application of
9. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1988).
10. The Pollution Prosecution Act also increased the number of civil investigators and estab-
lished the National Training Institute to train federal, state, and local lawyers, inspectors, and
technical experts in the enforcement of federal environmental laws. Id.
11. See Jane F. Barrett & Veronica M. Clarke, Perspectives on the Knowledge Requirement of
Section 6928(d) of RCRA After United States v. Dee, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 862, 883 (1991).
Jane Barrett is an Assistant U.S. Attorney in the District of Maryland, and Veronica Clarke was
formerly an Assistant U.S. Attorney in the same office. The authors were the prosecutors in
United States v. Dee, 912 F.2d 741 (4th Cir. 1990). See infra notes 189-203 and accompanying
text.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)-(e). Other environmental statutes with a knowledge requirement in-
clude: Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1361(b) (1988); Toxic
Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2614, 2615(b) (1988); Federal Water Pollution Control
Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (1988); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c) (1988); Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9603 (commonly re-
ferred to as "Superfund"); Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 11045(b)(4); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2)-(3) (1988).
13. See Barrett & Clarke, supra note 11, at 883 (contending that although it is often relatively
easy to assign knowledge to the low-level employee who dumped or buried the waste, it is much
more difficult to climb up the corporate ladder and prove that a corporate executive had knowl-
edge of a RCRA violation).
14. Id.
15. See, e.g., United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co., 933 F.2d 35 (Ist Cir.
1991) (instructing the jury on both the willful blindness doctrine and the RCO doctrine); see also
Barrett & Clarke, supra note 11, at 885-86 n.128 (discussing United States v. Dee, 912 F.2d 741




these doctrines to RCRA, however, has raised concern that they fail
to give effect to the knowledge requirement that Congress has ex-
pressly included in the statute, and that they thereby convict indi-
viduals for conduct that is, at worst, negligent.1 6
With this concern as the underlying focus, this Comment exam-
ines the "knowledge" requirement of section 6928(d) of RCRA.
Section I provides a brief overview of RCRA and ou.tlines the sub-
stantive law that defines the current scope of the "knowledge" re-
quirement under RCRA. In addition, Section I sets forth both the
RCO doctrine and the willful blindness doctrine.1 7 Section II sug-
gests not only that proper use of the willful blindness doctrine is
consistent with the knowledge requirement under section 6928(d),
but also that Congress intended for it to be used under that section.
In contrast, this section demonstrates that the RCO doctrine re-
quires a lower evidentiary showing which not only discourages the
use of the willful blindness doctrine, but also creates a negligence, if
not strict, standard of liability for corporate officers, not intended by
Congress.
I. BACKGROUND
A. An Overview of RCRA
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act was enacted in
1976 as a congressional response to the growing number of hazard-
ous waste sites resulting from unregulated waste disposal prac-
tices. 18 Congress intended RCRA to serve as a regulatory scheme
that would control hazardous materials from "cradle-to-grave" in
order to provide "nationwide protection against the dangers of im-
16. See Keith A. Onsdorff & James M. Mesnard, The Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine
in RCRA Criminal Enforcement: What You Don't Know Can Hurt You, [1992] 22 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,0999, 10,1000 (stating that application of the RCO doctrine "has tilted the
balance in the criminal justice arena away from due process safeguards, which are intended to
protect the innocent while allowing for the just punishment of truly guilty individuals"); Jed S.
Rakoff, Moral Qualms About Environmental Prosecutions, N.Y.L.J., June 11, 1991 (arguing that
the ultimate effect of applying the RCO doctrine to RCRA is to open the way for corporate
officers to be convicted of environmental crimes that they neither know of nor caused); see also
Karen M. Hansen, "Knowing" Environmental Crimes, 16 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 987, 1023
(1990) (commenting that a willful blindness instruction should not be used whire a statute re-
quires knowledge and where facts and circumstances are such that the defendant's mental state is
merely one of mistake, reckless disregard of the truth, or negligent failure to inquire).
17. The willful blindness doctrine is also referred to by commentators as the "conscious avoid-
ance" or "deliberate ignorance" doctrine.
18. H.R. REP. No. 1491, supra note 2, at 2-4, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6240-42.
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proper hazardous waste disposal."'" To achieve this purpose, the
statute established both a permit requirement for facilities that
treat, store, or dispose of hazardous wastes2" and a comprehensive
system for tracking all hazardous wastes. 21
Under the permit scheme, the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) identifies and lists solid wastes that meet the statutory defini-
tion of a hazardous waste. 2 To date, the EPA has described and
listed hundreds of different noxious substances as such. 23 Because
these hazardous wastes vary immensely in terms of toxicity and
other characteristics, the manner in which facilities can safely treat,
store, or dispose of them differs. Therefore, a facility must always
obtain a proper permit to ensure hazardous wastes are directed to
and maintained by a suitable facility.24 To obtain a permit, a facil-
ity must satisfy stringent regulatory requirements promulgated by
the EPA for each type of hazardous waste being handled. 21
In addition to the permit scheme, the statute establishes a system
for tracking hazardous wastes.26 This system requires generators
and transporters of hazardous waste and owners and operators of
treatment, storage, and disposal facilities to maintain a shipping
record referred to as a "hazardous waste manifest. '27 The manifest
identifies the type of hazardous waste being handled and tracks the
waste from production, through its transportation, to its final desti-
nation .2  The information gathered in these manifests satisfies the
statutory purpose -of controlling the hazardous waste from "cradle to
grave."
Originally, compliance with this regulatory scheme was enforcea-
ble only through the assessment of civil penalties. 29 In 1980, how-
19. Id. at I1, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6249. RCRA was enacted to provide "a mul-
tifaceted approach for solving the problems associated with the 3-4 billion tons of discarded
materials generated each year, and the problems resulting from the anticipated 8% annual in-
crease in the volume of such waste." Id. at 2, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6239.
20. 42 U.S.C. § 6925 (1988).
21. Id. § 6922 (1988).
22. Id. § 6921 (1988).
23. Id. The first major regulations promulgated pursuant to RCRA Subtitle C (or hazardous
waste) became effective on November 19, 1980. 40 C.F.R. §§ 260-268 (1989).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 6925.
25. Id.
26. Id. § 6922.
27. Id. §9 6922(5), 6923(3), 6923(4), 6924(2).
28. Id. §§ 6922(5), 6923(3), 6923(4), 6924(2).
29. Under the civil enforcement provisions, the EPA may issue an order assessing a civil pen-
alty for any past or current violation, or it may commence a civil action in the U.S. district court
1464 [Vol. 42:1461
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ever, in reaction to growing concerns that waste disposal practices
were out of control,30 Congress amended RCRA to include criminal
enforcement provisions.31 Any person convicted under these criminal
provisions is guilty of a felony and is subject to severe penalties. For
instance, a conviction under section 6928(d), 32 which generally pro-
seeking appropriate relief, including a temporary or permanent injunction. 42 U.S.C.
§ 6928(a)(1). In the order, the EPA may suspend or revoke any permit and may assess a fine not
to exceed $25,000 for each day of noncompliance for each violation. In assessing the penalty,
however, the EPA is required to "take into account the seriousness of the violation and any good
faith efforts to comply with applicable requirements.". Id. § 6928(a)(3). In addition, failure to
take corrective action in the time specified in the compliance order can result in additional penal-
ties of not more than $25,000 for each day of continued noncompliance. Id. § 6928(c).
30. See Harris et al., supra note 3, at 205-07 (stating that the public perceived that pollution
was out of control).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)-(e).
32. Id. § 6928(d). The criminal penalties section provides:
Any person who -
(1) knowingly transports or causes to be transported any hazardous waste identified
or listed under this subchapter to a facility which does not have a permit under this
subchapter or pursuant to title I of the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries
Act (86 Stat. 1052) [33 U.S.C.A. § 1411 et seq.],
(2) knowingly treats, stores, or disposes of any hazardous waste identified or listed
under this subchapter -
(A) without a permit under this subchapter or pursuant to title I of the Marine
Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act (86 Stat. 1052) [33 U.S.C.A. § 1411 et
seq.]; or
(B) in knowing violation of any material condition or requirement of such permit;
(C) in knowing violation of any material condition or requirement of any applicable
interim status regulations or standards;
(3) knowingly omits material information or makes any false material statement or
representation in any application, label, manifest, record, report, permit, or other doc-
ument filed, maintained, or used for purposes of compliance with regulations promul-
gated by the Administrator (or by a State in the case of an authorized State pro-
gram) under this subchapter;
(4) knowingly generates, stores, treats, transports, disposes of, exports, or otherwise
handles any hazardous waste or any used oil not identified or listed as a hazardous
waste under this subchapter (whether such activity took place before or takes place
after the date of the enactment of this paragraph) and who knowingly destroys, alters,
conceals, or fails to file any record, application, manifest, report, or other document
required to be maintained or filed for purposes of compliance with regulations
promulgated by the Administrator (or by a State in the case of an authorized State
program) under this subchapter;
(5) knowingly transports without a manifest, or causes to be transported without a
manifest, any hazardous waste or any used oil not identified or listed as a hazardous
waste under this subchapter required by regulations promulgated under this sub-
chapter (or by a State in the case of a State program authorized under this sub-
chapter) to be accompanied by a manifest;
(6) knowingly exports a hazardous waste identified or listed under this subchapter
(A) without the consent of the receiving country or, (B) where there exists an interna-
tional agreement between the United States and the government of the receiving
country establishing notice, export, and enforcement procedures for the transporta-
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hibits any person from knowingly treating, storing, transporting, or
disposing of any hazardous waste without a permit,33 may result in
both a penalty of up to $50,000 for each day of a violation and
imprisonment for two or, in some cases, five years.34 Moreover, both
the fine and imprisonment are doubled for subsequent convictions. 35
A second provision, section 6928(e), 3 referred to as the "knowing
endangerment" provision,37 carries even harsher penalties for viola-
tors. To be convicted under this section, a person must "know" at
the time he or she violated a criminal proscription set forth in sec-
tion 6928(d) that another person was placed in "imminent danger of
death or serious bodily injury. 3 8 If convicted, the offender faces a
maximum of fifteen years imprisonment and a fine not to exceed
$250,000 for individuals and $1,000,000 for organizations.3 9 More-
over, in sentencing those convicted under both subsections 6928(d)
tion, treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous wastes, in a manner which is not in
conformance with such agreement; or
(7) knowingly stores, treats, transports, or causes to be transported, disposes of, or
otherwise handles any used oil not identified or listed as a hazardous waste under this
subchapter-
(A) in knowing violation of any material condition or requirement of a permit
under this subchapter; or
(B) in knowing violation of any material condition or requirement of any applicable
regulations or standards under this chapter;





36. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(e). This section provides in part:
Any person who knowingly transports, treats, stores, disposes of, or exports any
hazardous waste identified or listed under this subchapter or used oil not identified or
listed as a hazardous waste under this subchapter in violation of paragraph (1), (2),
(3), (4), (5), (6), or (7) of subsection (d) of this section who knows at that time that
he thereby places another person in imminent danger of death or serious bodily in-
jury, shall, upon conviction ....
id.
37. Id.
38. Id. When the knowing endangerment provision was originally enacted in 1980, not only did
the government have to prove knowledge concerning the underlying activities, but it also had to
show that the defendant's conduct manifested either "unjustified and inexcusable disregard for
human life" or "an extreme indifference to human life." Id. Recognizing the general reluctance to
enforce this provision given the government's heavy burden, Congress in 1984 repealed the "ex-
treme reluctance" and "unjustified disregard" elements of the provision. See Harris et al., supra
note 3, at 208-14, for a more extensive overview of the knowing endangerment provision.
39. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(f)(5). An organization is defined as "a legal entity, other than a govern-
ment, established or organized for any purpose, and such term includes a corporation, company,
association, firm, partnership, joint stock company, foundation, institution, trust, society, union, or
any other association of persons. Id.
1466
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and (e), federal judges must follow the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines issued in 1990.40 These guidelines call for mandated prison
sentences and significantly increase the amount of fines assessed.41
B. The Knowing Mental State
Before a person can be convicted under either criminal enforce-
ment provision and be subject to a fine or imprisonment, the govern-
ment must prove that a violation was committed "knowingly." '42 Al-
though these provisions unequivocally require proof of knowledge,
considerable uncertainty remains as to what constitutes a knowing
mental state sufficient to convict a person under RCRA. Speaking
generally of all federal criminal laws, the Supreme Court, in
Liparato v. United States,4 noted that when Congress uses the
word "knowingly," some level of mental culpability is intended."
Although this much is true, courts have interpreted the term to en-
compass a variety of mental states.4 5
Under the modern view, reflected in the Model Penal Code, the
word "knowingly" requires actual awareness of the nature of the act
or omission, the results that follow from an act or omission, or the
circumstances indicating an act or omission." Therefore, the know-
40. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION GUIDELINES MANUAL (1990) (commenting
that the sentencing guidelines were issued by the U.S. Sentencing Commission, whose authority is
derived from the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2017 (codified at
28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1988))) [hereinafter GUIDELINES MANUAL].
41. Id. Under the sentencing system, the Commission sets a "base level" period of imprison-
ment and fine amount for every federal criminal offense. GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 40,
§ IBI.I. The judge may add or subtract from this base level depending on the presence or ab-
sence of specific offense characteristics such as the defendant's role in the offense, the number of
counts upon which the defendant has been convicted, and the defendant's willingness to accept
responsibility for the wrongdoing. Id.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)-(f).
43. 471 U.S. 419 (1985).
44. Id. at 424. Referring to the federal statute governing food stamp fraud, 7 U.S.C.
§ 2024(b)(1) (1988), the Supreme Court stated that "Congress certainly intended by use of the
word 'knowingly' to require some mental state with respect to some element of the crime defined."
Id.
45. See I WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 3.5(b), at
307 (1986). In addition to proof of actual knowledge,
cases have held that one has knowledge of a given fact when he has the means for
obtaining such knowledge, when he has notice of facts which would put one on in-
quiry as to the existence of that fact, when he has information sufficient to generate a
reasonable belief as to that fact, or when the circumstances are such that a reasonable
man would believe that such a fact existed.
i id.
46. I Id.; MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(b) (1985).
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ing mental state requires subjective awareness or personal knowl-
edge of facts or circumstances. As a result, proof of objective fault
(i.e., that a reasonably prudent corporate officer should have known
of the RCRA violation) usually associated with mere negligence,
would not satisfy the requirement.47
This personal or actual knowledge requirement is also consistent
with the basic tenet of criminal law that wrongdoing must be con-
scious to be criminal."8 According to the Supreme Court, by using
the term "guilty knowledge" to signify mental culpability, courts
have "sought to protect those who were not blameworthy in
mind." '49 However, even where mens rea is required, the Supreme
Court has also held that "the Government may prove by reference
to facts and circumstances surrounding the case that [the defend-
ant] knew that his conduct was unauthorized or illegal.""0 Prosecu-
tors may therefore satisfy the mens rea requirement in the absence
of direct proof of guilty knowledge by utilizing circumstantial
evidence.
Even with the benefit of circumstantial evidence, however, in the
context of environmental criminal enforcement, federal prosecutors
claim that satisfying the knowledge requirement can be particularly
difficult with respect to corporate executives." This difficulty has
been explained as follows:
Although it is often relatively easy to assign knowledge and blame to the
low-level employee who dumped or buried hazardous waste, or to prove that
a shift foreman or plant manager personally directed the employee's actions,
it is much more difficult to climb up the corporate ladder and prove that a
corporate executive had knowledge of a RCRA violation. Often corporate
47. See I LAFAVE & SCOTT. supra note 45, § 3.4(c), at 360 (stating that a "negligent" mental
state involves "objective fault in creating an unreasonable risk" through either acting, failing to
act, or causing a result).
48. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250-51 (1952). In Morissette, the Court stated:
The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by intention
is no provincial or transient notion. It is as universal and persistent in mature systems
of law as belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and duty of the
normal individual to choose between good and evil. A relation between some mental
element and punishment for a harmful act is almost as instinctive as the child's famil-
iar exculpatory "But I didn't mean to," and has afforded the rational basis for a tardy
and unfinished substitution of deterrence and reformation in place of retaliation and
vengeance as the motivation for public prosecution.
Id.
49. Id. at 252.
50. Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 434 (1985).
51. See Barrett & Clarke, supra note 11, at 883.
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"WILLFUL BLINDNESS"
executives are successful at insulating themselves from culpability by dele-
gating "hands-on" business responsibilities to subordinates.6
To address this problem, the government advocates the use of both
the willful blindness doctrine and the responsible corporate officer
doctrine.5 3 These prosecutorial doctrines attempt to satisfy the mens
rea requirement without direct proof of knowledge of material ele-
ments of the crime by allowing jurors to infer knowledge based on
circumstantial evidence. 4
C. The Willful Blindness Doctrine as a Basis for Criminal
Liability
The willful blindness doctrine developed in modern criminal juris-
prudence as an important exception to direct proof of personal
knowledge. The doctrine is grounded in the notion that "deliberate
ignorance and positive knowledge are equally culpable."55 The the-
ory is derived from the common understanding that a person "knows
of facts of which he is less than absolutely certain" when that per-
son is aware of a high probability of the existence of such facts. 6
On this basis, the doctrine allows the trier-of-fact to infer guilty
knowledge where there is evidence that the defendant consciously
avoided discovering the existence of illegal activity. 7
Therefore, under the willful blindness doctrine, a corporate officer
may become criminally culpable by intentionally shielding herself
from positive knowledge in hopes of creating a defense from prose-
cution. For instance, in United States v. MacDonald & Watson
Waste Oil Co.,58 the First Circuit upheld the use of the willful
blindness doctrine under section 6928(d) of RCRA.5 9 The district
court had instructed the jury as follows:
52. Id.
53. For example, in United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co., 933 F.2d 35 (1st
Cir. 1991), the instruction at issue instructed the jury on both the RCO doctrine and the willful
blindness doctrine. Id. at 50-52. The jury was also instructed on both doctrines in United States v.
Dee. See Barrett & Clarke, supra note 11, at 884-85.
54. See infra notes 54-113 and accompanying text (discussing the willful blindness doctrine and
the RCO doctrine as bases for criminal liability).
55. United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 700 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 951 (1976).
56. Id.
57. United States v. Alvarado, 838 F.2d 311, 314 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1222
(1988).
58. 933 F.2d 35 (1st Cir. 1991).
59. Brief for the United States at 49, United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co.,
933 F.2d 35 (1st Cir. 1991).
1993] 1469
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In determining whether a Defendant acted knowingly, you also may con-
sider whether the Defendant deliberately closed his eyes to what otherwise
would have been obvious. If so, the element of knowledge may be satisfied
because a Defendant cannot avoid responsibility by purposely avoiding
learning the truth. However, mere negligence or mistake in not learning the
facts is not sufficient to satisfy the element of knowledge. 60
In upholding this instruction, the MacDonald & Watson court sim-
ply held that circumstantial evidence of "willful blindness to the
facts constituting the offense may be sufficient to establish
knowledge."'"
The MacDonald & Watson decision is consistent with the ex-
pressed intent of Congress in favor of the willful blindness doctrine's
application to both subsections 6928(d) and (e) of RCRA. 2 Report-
ing on the 1984 amendments of section 6928(d), the criminal sanc-
tions section, the House Judiciary Committee explicitly stated that
"[t]he term 'knowing' includes the concept of 'willful blindness'...
so that it will not be possible for someone to avoid criminal responsi-
bility by deliberately remaining ignorant about the material condi-
tions and requirements of permits and of interim status regula-
tion."63 Moreover, with respect to section 6928(e), the knowing
endangerment section, the statute itself specifically provides for the
use of the willful blindness doctrine under the special rules provi-
sion. 4 Congress adopted the special rules provision to clarify the
60. Id.
61. MacDonald & Watson, 933 F.2d at 54-55.
62. H.R. REP. No. 198, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 8-9 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5643-44.
63. Id. at 9, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5644.
64. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(f). This special rules section provides in pertinent part:
For the purposes of subsection (e) of this section -
(I) A person's state of mind is knowing with respect to -
(A) his conduct, if he is aware of the nature of his conduct;
(B) an existing circumstance, if he is aware or believes that the circumstance
exists; or
(C) a result of his conduct, if he is aware or believes that his conduct is
substantially certain to cause danger of death or serious bodily injury.
(2) In determining whether a defendant who is a natural person knew that his con-
duct placed another person in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury -
(A) the person is responsible only for actual awareness or actual belief that
he possessed; and
(B) knowledge possessed by a person other than the.defendant but not by the
defendant himself may not be attributed to the defendant; Provided, That in
proving the defendant's possession of actual knowledge, circumstantial evi-
dence may be used, including evidence that the defendant took affirmative
steps to shield himself from relevant information.
1470 [Vol. 42:1461
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concept of knowledge in the context of an endangerment offense.
The provision states in part, "[I]n proving the defendant's posses-
sion of actual knowledge, circumstantial evidence may be used, in-
cluding evidence that the defendant took affirmative steps to shield
himself from relevant information."
Although Congress seemed to approve of, if not encourage, the
use of the willful blindness doctrine under RCRA, many courts have
strongly urged that the doctrine be used sparingly. 66 Such caution is
founded on the belief that a willful blindness instruction presents "a
risk that the jury will convict on a standard of negligence. '"67 In
United States v. Pacific Hide & Fur Depot, Inc.,6 8 a case involving
an environmental criminal provision of the Toxic Substances Con-
trol Act (TSCA) that requires guilty knowledge, the Ninth Circuit
commented as follows:
A [willful blindness] instruction is properly given only when defendant
claims a lack of guilty knowledge and the proof at trial supports an infer-
ence of deliberate ignorance. It is not enough that defendant was mistaken,
recklessly disregarded the truth, or negligently failed to inquire. Instead, the
government must present evidence indicating that defendant purposely con-
trived to avoid learning all of the facts in order to have a defense in the
event of subsequent prosecution. Absent such evidence, the jury might im-
properly infer guilty knowledge on the basis of mere negligence without
proof of deliberate avoidance. 9
Under this view, the circumstances that support the willful blindness
instruction are those that involve conscious action by the defend-
ant.7 0 Consistent with this notion, a threshold test is used to deter-
mine if the instruction is appropriate.7 1 This test requires that the
evidence at trial raise two inferences: "(1) the defendant was sub-
jectively aware of a high probability of the existence of the illegal
65. 42 U.S.C § 6928(f). In discussing this section, the Report of the Conference Committee on
the 1980 RCRA Amendments emphasized the difficulty in finding direct evidence of what a per-
son actually knew and thus wanted "to avoid any implication that the requirement of actual
knowledge would render inadmissible any otherwise probative evidence on this element." See S.
REP. No. 172, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5039.
66. United States v. Alvarado, 838 F.2d 311, 314 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1222
(1988).
67. Id.
68. 768 F.2d 1096 (9th Cir. 1985).
69. Id. at 1098 (citations omitted).
70. Id. at 1099.
71. See United States v. Lara-Velasquez, 919 F.2d 946, 951-52 (5th Cir. 1990).
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conduct; and (2) the defendant purposely contrived to avoid learning
of the illegal conduct."72
The language of the first prong of this test, derived from the
Model Penal Code,7" acts to narrowly circumscribe application of
the doctrine." In United States v. Lara-Velasquez,75 the Fifth Cir-
cuit explained that the first prong protects the defendant from being
convicted for mere negligent conduct by requiring the government
to present facts that support the inference that the defendant had
subjective knowledge of the illegal activity. 76 Requiring evidence of
subjective awareness prevents the government from establishing
guilty knowledge by simply demonstrating objective fault on the ba-
sis of what a reasonable person should have known.77
The Lara-Velasquez court further noted that the second prong of
the test can be reached only if the first prong is satisfied: "[A] de-
fendant could not purposely avoid learning of illegal conduct unless
he were subjectively aware that the high probability of illegal con-
duct exists."'78 The court identified two situations where courts have
found the second prong satisfied: (1) where the defendant admits an
intent to avoid incriminating knowledge and (2) where the defend-
ant's involvement in the criminal offense is so "overwhelmingly sus-
picious" that his failure to question the suspicious circumstances es-
tablishes the purposeful contrivance.79 Under either situation, the
primary concern - that there is sufficient evidence to prove that the
72. Id. at 951.
73. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(7) (1985) ("When knowledge of the existence of a particular
fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a person is aware of a high
probability of its existence, unless he actually believes that it does not exist.").
74. See I LAFAVE & SCOTT. supra note 45, § 3.5(b).
75. 919 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1990).
76. Id. at 952.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. For examples of the first situation, see United States v. Peddle, 821 F.2d 1521 (1 Ith
Cir. 1987), and United States v. Batencort, 592 F.2d 916 (5th Cir. 1979). In Peddle, the defend-
ants suspected that a boat they were hired to sail concealed illegal substances but did not inspect
the boat because they "didn't even want to know." 821 F.2d at 1523. In Batencort, the defendant
who was hired to transport a suitcase admitted that "he had something in the suitcase that he
shouldn't, but he didn't know exactly what." 592 F.2d at 918.
For examples of the second situation, see United States v. de Luna, 815 F.2d 301 (5th Cir.
1987), and United States v. Restrepo-Granda, 575 F.2d 524 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 935
(1978). In de Luna, the defendant was offered $10,000 to deliver a load of cabbage into the
United States - in a truck which concealed marijuana - even though the job usually paid only
$1,000. 815 F.2d at 302. In Restrepo-Granda, the defendant was given a set of coat hangers on
which to carry his clothes into the United States; the coat hangers, which concealed cocaine, were
noticeably oversized and unusual. 575 F.2d at 527.
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defendant's failure to act was deliberate and not negligent - is sat-
isfied. This two-prong test, therefore, safeguards against the indis-
criminate use of the willful blindness doctrine in order to avoid the
prosecution and conviction of negligent or innocent defendants.
D. The Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine as a Basis for
Criminal Liability
While proper use of the willful blindness doctrine can safeguard
against convicting defendants for mere negligence, application of the
responsible corporate officer doctrine may be unable to prevent such
a conviction. Under the RCO doctrine, a corporate officer may be
criminally culpable if, by reason of his position and authority, he
had the power or capacity to prevent or correct the violation com-
plained of and failed to do so. 80 This criminal culpability arises even
when the corporate officer did not actively participate in the com-
mission of the offense. 1
Two Supreme Court cases, United States v. Dotterweich82 and
United States v. Park,83 provide the foundation for the RCO doc-
trine. Both of these cases involved misdemeanor offenses under pro-
visions of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA)84 that
do not include a scienter requirement.8 5 In Dotterweich, the Su-
preme Court upheld the conviction of the president and general
manager of a pharmaceutical company for shipping adulterated and
mislabeled drugs in interstate commerce even though he was una-
ware of the facts that led to the violation. 86 The Court found that
those who simply have "a responsible share in the furtherance of the
transaction which the statute outlaws," regardless of whether there
is awareness of wrongdoing, commit an offense.8 7 Relying on the
overriding interest of protecting human health and welfare, 88 the
Court found it permissible for Congress to place such a burden on
''a person otherwise innocent but standing in responsible relation to
80. United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 673-74 (1975).
81. Id. at 670, 674.
82. 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
83. 421 U.S. 658 (1975).
84. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-393 (1988).
85. See id. § 331.
86. 320 U.S. at 278.
87. Id. at 284.
88. The Court emphasized that the purposes of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act
"touch phases of the lives and health of people which, in the circumstances of modern industrial-
ism, are largely beyond self-protection." Id. at 280.
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a public danger."8 9 Consequently, for the first time, the Supreme
Court accepted the notion that an individual could be criminally lia-
ble as a result of his mere function in an organization, without re-
gard to his mental state.
In United States v. Park,9" the Supreme Court reaffirmed and
further defined the RCO doctrine. The defendant, Park, was chief
executive officer and president of a national retail food chain with
approximately 36,000 employees, 874 retail outlets, and 16 ware-
houses."' Although the defendant worked out of the national head-
quarters in Philadelphia, he was charged with multiple violations of
the FDCA as a result of rodent infestation in a Baltimore ware-
house.9 2 The evidence showed that Park had been informed by the
Federal Food and Drug Administration on previous occasions of
contamination discovered during warehouse inspections.93 The evi-
dence also showed that although Park was not directly in charge of
day-to-day sanitation management, he did have general supervisory
authority over that function.94 In his defense, Park presented evi-
dence that he had -been informed by in-house legal counsel that im-
mediate corrective action would be taken by the Baltimore division
vice president.95 In addition, he stated that he believed nothing more
could have been done constructively than what he found was being
done.96
The Supreme Court affirmed Park's conviction, though not "solely
on the basis of [his] position in the corporation. 97 Instead, the
Court found that Park " 'had a responsible relation to the situation,'
and 'by virtue of his position .. .had . ..authority and responsi-
bility' to deal with the situation." 98 Cloaked with this authority and
responsibility, Park had a duty not only to implement measures to
prevent violations, but to seek out and remedy violations that oc-
curred. 99 The Court felt that, although these duties "are beyond
question demanding, and perhaps onerous, . . . they are no more
89. Id. at 281.
90. 421 U.S. 658 (1975).
91. Id. at 660.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 661-62.
94. Id. at 662-64.
95. Id. at 663-64.
96. Id. at 664.
97. Id. at 674.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 672.
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stringent than the public has a right to expect of those who volunta-
rily assume positions of authority in business enterprises whose ser-
vices and products affect the health and well-being of the public
that supports them." 100
Of special importance, however, in considering the RCO doc-
trine's applicability to RCRA violations are the Court's comments
respecting the historical significance of imposing the doctrine only
where the statute dispenses with mens rea.' 10 Referring to cases
holding managers criminally liable for the acts of their agents, the
Court noted:
[Tlhe liability of managerial officers did not depend on their knowledge of,
or personal participation in, the act made criminal by the statute. Rather,
where the statute under which they were prosecuted dispensed with "con-
sciousness of wrongdoing," an omission or failure to act was deemed a suffi-
cient basis for a responsible corporate agent's liability.1
0
This language brings into question whether the doctrine can be ap-
plied to statutes such as RCRA that include a scienter requirement.
Moreover, both Dotterweich and Park involved misdemeanor of-
fenses, and the Court has stated that "the historic conception of a
'misdemeanor' makes all those responsible for it equally guilty."' 0 3
This historical justification for holding responsible parties liable
would not be present where, as with RCRA, severe felony sanctions
are imposed.0 These considerations raise serious questions concern-
ing the compatibility of the RCO doctrine with the criminal provi-
sions of RCRA. 10
Perhaps based on these considerations, Congress has eliminated
100. Id.
101. Id. at 670-71; see also United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 281 (1943) (stating
that "such legislation dispenses with the conventional requirement for criminal conduct - aware-
ness of some wrongdoing").
102. Park, 421 U.S. at 670-71.
103. Donerweich, 320 U.S. at 281 (citing United States v. Mills, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 138, 141
(1833)).
104. See id. At least one court, however, has held that the RCO doctrine is not limited to
misdemeanor offenses. In United States v. Cattle King Packing Co., 793 F.2d 232, 240 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1985 (1986), the founder of a meat packing and distribution com-
pany was charged with various intentional and fraudulent acts in violation of the Federal Meat
Inspection Act. 793 F.2d at 234. On appeal from his conviction, the defendant argued that the
RCO instruction was improperly given because it only applies to misdemeanor offenses. Id. at 240.
Although there was substantial evidence of intentional wrongdoing, and thus some question as to
whether the RCO doctrine was actually applied, the Tenth Circuit opined that nothing in the
Park decision limits the doctrine's application to misdemeanor offenses. Id.
105. See Onsdorff & Mesnard, supra note 16, at 10,102-03.
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any possibility that the RCO doctrine could be applied to RCRA's
"knowing endangerment" offense, defined under section 6928(e)."'0
Congress adopted a "special rules" section to define the state of
mind necessary for an endangerment crime. 01 These special rules
specifically provide that a person is responsible only for the actual
awareness or actual belief that he or she possessed, and not for
knowledge possessed by another person. 108 Discussing these rules,
the Report of the Conference Committee on the 1980 RCRA
Amendments stated that the actual knowledge requirement "may be
established by direct or circumstantial evidence, but not constructive
or vicarious knowledge."10 9 Therefore, "knowledge that the defend-
ant should have had, could have had, or would have had under vari-
ous circumstances does not suffice if he did not actually have the
requisite knowledge about the danger at the time he acted." 10 The
conferees emphasized that "[a] supervisor . . . who personally lacks
the necessary knowledge, should not be criminally prosecuted for
knowledge that only his subordinates possessed.""'
Therefore, as evidenced by the Conference Report, use of the
RCO doctrine is clearly prohibited with respect to the "knowing en-
dangerment" provision. The conferees declined to provide any guid-
ance, however, as to the applicability of the RCO doctrine to the
"criminal penalties" section."' Rather, the report stated that "[t]he
conferees have not sought to define 'knowing' for offenses under sub-
section (d); that process has been left to the courts under general
principles."'1 3 Therefore, the courts have been delegated sole au-
thority to interpret the scope of the knowledge requirement under
section 6928(d), including whether knowledge may be imputed
merely from corporate responsibility.
106. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(f).
107. Id.; see supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text (explaining the concept of "knowledge"
in the special rules section).
108. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(f). However, as noted before, under these rules, the government may
prove actual knowledge by use of circumstantial evidence, including evidence that the defendant
took affirmative steps to shield himself from relevant information. See supra notes 71-80 and
accompanying text (discussing the application of a two-prong test to prove actual knowledge).
109. See S. REP. No. 172, supra note 65, at 37, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5037.
110. Id. at 39, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5038.
I 11. Id. at 40, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5039.
112. See id. at 39-40, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5038-40.
113. Id. at 39, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5038.
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E. Judicial Interpretation of the Knowledge Requirement Under
Section 6928(d) - the Criminal Penalties Section
In exercising this grant of interpretive authority, the courts have
grappled with several issues that generally arise in the context of an
action by the federal government enforcing section 6928(d) against
corporate officers. One issue, of course, is whether guilty knowledge
may be imputed by use of the RCO doctrine. The courts have also
been forced to determine what constitutes sufficient proof of a cor-
porate officer's knowledge. For example, the courts have had to de-
cide whether the government must prove the corporate officer had
knowledge: (1) that violating RCRA is a crime; (2) that a permit is
required for his activities; (3) that he was acting without the proper
permit; and (3) that the materials he or she was handling were
"hazardous" within the meaning of the statute.'14 As will be more
fully discussed, the courts' answers to these questions have been
greatly influenced by RCRA's status as a public welfare statute. '
The manner in which the federal courts have resolved these ques-
tions provides the proper context in which to consider the applica-
tion of the RCO doctrine.'16
1. The Relationship Between RCRA's Status as a Public Welfare
Statute and the Knowledge Requirement
Since RCRA's enactment, federal courts have characterized it as
a public welfare statute, referring to its overall purpose of promot-
ing and protecting human health and the environment." 7 Relying
114. See United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 786 F.2d 1499, 1503 n.5 (11 th Cir. 1986); United
States v. Liparota, 471 U.S. 419, 424 n.7 (1985).
115. See infra notes 117-34 and accompanying text (discussing the relationship between
RCRA's status as a public welfare statute and the knowledge requirement).
116. To date, only ten federal appellate court decisions have addressed the mens rea require-
ment of § 6928(d) of RCRA: United States v. Dean, 969 F.2d 187, 190-92 (6th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 1852 (1993); United States v. Speach, 968 F.2d 795, 796-97 (9th Cir. 1992);
United States v. Baytank (Houston), Inc., 934 F.2d 599 (5th Cir. 1991); United States v. Mac-
Donald & Watson Waste Oil Co., 933 F.2d 35, 47-50 (1st Cir. 1991); United States v. Sellers,
926 F.2d 410, 414-17 (5th Cir. 1991); United States v. Dee, 912 F.2d 741, 745-47 (4th Cir.
1990), cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 1307 (1991); United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033, 1036-39 (9th
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1083 (1990); United States v. Greer, 850 F.2d 1447, 1450-52
(IIth Cir. 1988); United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 786 F.2d 1499, 1502-05 (11th Cir. 1986);
United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662, 666-68 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1208 (1985).
117. See MacDonald & Watson, 933 F.2d at 46 (stating that "RCRA is a public welfare
statute 'enacted to protect the national health and environment' ") (quoting Wycoff Co. v. EPA,
796 F.2d 1197, 1198 (9th Cir. 1986)); see also Hayes Int'l, 786 F.2d at 1503 (stating that the
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on this characterization and purpose, federal courts have taken a
less restrictive interpretation of the knowledge requirement as it ap-
plies to section 6928(d). 18 Consequently, the mens rea requirement
necessary to support a conviction has been essentially reduced to
knowledge of facts or circumstances pertaining to the RCRA viola-
tion, instead of knowledge of the regulatory scheme." 9
The justification for interpreting the knowledge requirement of
public welfare statutes less restrictively comes from the seminal case
of United States v. International Minerals & Chemical Corp.2 ' In
International Minerals, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction
of a corporate officer under a statute that punished anyone who
knowingly violated any regulation issued by the Interstate Com-
merce Commission. 2' The defendant had shipped sulfuric acid and
hydrofluosilicic acid in interstate commerce and knowingly failed to
show on the shipping papers that the cargo was corrosive liquid. 22
The Supreme Court rejected the defendant's argument that actual
knowledge of the provision must be proved and held instead that
where "dangerous or deleterious devices or products or obnoxious
waste materials are involved, the probability of regulation is so great
that anyone who is aware that he is in possession of them or dealing
with them must be presumed to be aware of the regulation."' 2 3 It is
only the regulatory scheme, however, and not other facts and cir-
cumstances, that the defendant is presumed to know.' 24 As the
Court pointed out, mistake of fact could be a defense, for example,
statute is "undeniably a public welfare statute, involving a heavily regulated area with great
ramifications for the public health and safety"); Baytank, 934 F.2d at 613 (same); Johnson.&
Towers, 741 F.2d at 667-68 (same). The statutory language states that the "disposal of . . .
hazardous waste in or on the land without careful planning and management can present a danger
to human health and the environment" and that "the placement of inadequate controls on hazard-
ous waste management will result in substantial risks to human health and environment." 42
U.S.C. § 6901(b)(2), (5).
118. See infra notes 120-37 and accompanying text (discussing the development of the Su-
preme Court's interpretation of the knowledge requirement).
119. See, e.g., Baytank, 934 F.2d at 613 (holding that under § 6928(d)(2)(A), the word
"'knowingly' means no more than that the defendant knows factually what he is doing - storing,
what is being stored, and that what is being stored factually has the potential for harm to others
or the environment, and that he has no permit - and it is not required that he know that there is
a regulation which says what he is storing is hazardous under RCRA").
120. 402 U.S. 558 (1971).
121. Id. at 558.
122. Id. at 558-59.
123. Id. at 564-65
124. The Court found such a presumption to be consistent with the general principle of crimi-
nal jurisprudence that ignorance of the law is no defense. Id. at 563.
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where a person in good faith believed he was shipping distilled water
when in fact he was shipping sulfuric acid. 25
In deciding to apply the presumption created by International
Minerals to the criminal provisions of RCRA, the courts declined to
follow another Supreme Court case. In Liparota v. United States,'26
the defendant was indicted for acquiring and possessing food stamps
in violation of a federal statute governing food stamp fraud. 27 Rely-
ing on International Minerals, the government argued that the de-
fendant could be convicted under the statute if it proved he knew
that he acquired or possessed food stamps. 12 8 The Supreme Court,
however, was unwilling to relieve the government of the burden of
proving that the defendant knew possession of food stamps was un-
authorized by the statute.'29 The Court believed that this would
only "criminalize a broad range of apparently innocent conduct."' 30
Moreover, the Court did not feel that the prosecution was being
overly burdened since knowledge of illegality may be proved simply
"by reference to facts and circumstances surrounding the case."''
Of critical importance, however, were the grounds upon which the
International Minerals decision was distinguished. The Court held
that acquiring and possessing food stamps was not "a type of con-
duct that a reasonable person should know is subject to stringent
public regulation and may seriously threaten the community's
health and safety."' 32 Lower courts have seized upon this language
as the basis for following International Minerals in interpreting
RCRA's knowledge requirement.13 3 As one court stated, RCRA "is
undeniably a public welfare statute, involving a heavily regulated
area with great ramifications to public health and safety . . . it is
completely fair and reasonable to charge those who choose to oper-
ate in such areas with knowledge of the regulatory provisions." 134
125. Id. at 563-64.
126. 471 U.S. 419, 432-33 (1985).
127. Id. at 421.
128. Id. at 423.
129. Id. at 426.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 434.
132. Id. at 433.
133. See United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 786 F.2d 1499, 1502-03 (11 th Cir. 1986); United
States v. Baytank (Houston), Inc., 934 F.2d 599, 612-13 (5th Cir. 1991).
134. Hayes Int'l Corp., 786 F.2d at 1503.
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2. Knowledge That Violation of RCRA Is a Crime
By concluding that International Minerals, and not Liparota,
controlled in interpreting RCRA, federal courts have limited the
mens rea requirement to knowledge of facts and circumstances,
rather than requiring knowledge of the regulatory scheme. 13 5 Conse-
quently, the government is not required to prove that the defendant
knew that violating the statute could result in criminal punish-
ment. 136 Consistent with International Minerals, courts have rea-
soned that since hazardous wastes are dangerous and deleterious
materials that can have a severe adverse impact on human health
and the environment, it is fair and reasonable to presume that a
defendant has knowledge of RCRA's criminal provisions. 3 There-
fore, a defendant cannot escape criminal liability by claiming that
he did not know or realize that the activity at issue was illegal.
3. Knowledge of the Permit Requirement and a Facility's Permit
Status
The majority of criminal actions brought under section 6928(d) of
RCRA involve permit violations. The two criminal provisions of
RCRA that govern permit violations are subsection 6928(d)(1) and
subsection 6928(d)(2).38 Subsection 6928(d)(1) pertains to trans-
porters of hazardous waste (transporter provision), and subsection
6928(d)(2) pertains to persons who treat, store, or dispose of haz-
ardous waste at a facility (facility operator provision).' 39 With re-
spect to the facility operator provision, the federal circuits are in
conflict as to its proper construction. " 0 Under this provision, it is
unlawful to "(2) knowingly treat[], store[], or dispose[] of any haz-
135. See supra notes 120-37 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's reasoning
in International Minerals and Liparota).
136. United States v. Dee, 912 F.2d 741, 745 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that the government did
not need to prove that the defendants knew a violation of RCRA was a crime), cert. denied, Ill
S. Ct. 1307 (1991).
137. See supra notes 120-24 and accompanying text (discussing the facts of International
Minerals).
138. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d).
139. Id. § 6928(d)(1).
140. Compare United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662, 668-69 (3d Cir. 1984)
(finding it unlikely that Congress could have intended to subject persons to criminal prosecution
who acted without a permit irrespective of their knowledge), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985)
with United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033, 1038 (9th Cir. 1989) (declining to follow the John-
son & Towers analysis, reasoning that, had Congress intended knowledge of the lack of a permit
to be an element of the offense, it easily could have said so), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1083 (1990).
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ardous waste . . . (A) without a permit . . .; or (B) in knowing
violation of any material condition or requirement of such per-
mit. ' 141 Given the manner in which this section is drafted, the ques-
tion arises as to whether the word "knowingly" was intended to
modify the permit language.
In United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 4 ' the Third Circuit
held that "knowingly" does modify the permit language.1 43 The
court reasoned as follows:
It is unlikely that Congress could have intended to subject to criminal prose-
cution those persons who acted when no permit had been obtained irrespec-
tive of their knowledge (under subsection (A)), but not those persons who
acted in violation of the terms of a permit unless that action was knowing
(subsection (B)). Thus, we are led to conclude either that the omission of
the word "knowing" in (A) was inadvertent or that "knowingly" which in-
troduces subsection (2) applies to subsection (A). "
Using this reasoning, the Johnson & Towers court concluded that
the government must prove that the defendant knew that a permit
was required and that the facility did not have a proper permit. 45
In United States v. Hoflin,14' however, the Ninth Circuit reached
the opposite conclusion, expressly rejecting the Third Circuit's anal-
ysis.' 4 7 The court pointed out that the absence of the word "know-
ing" in subsection (A) is in stark contrast to its presence in subsec-
tion (B) and concluded:
Had Congress intended knowledge of the lack of a permit to an element
under subsection (A) it easily could have said so. It specifically inserted a
knowledge element in subsection (B), and it did so notwithstanding the
"knowingly" modifier which introduces subsection (2). In the face of such
obvious congressional action we will not write something into the statute
which Congress so plainly left out. 4 8
Therefore, under this interpretation of the facility operator provi-
sion, neither knowledge of the permit requirement nor knowledge of
141. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2).
142. 741 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985).
143. Id. at 669.
144. Id. at 668.
145. Id. at 669. The court stated that "it is evident that the district court will be required to
instruct the jury, inter alia, that in order to convict each defendant the jury must find that each
knew that Johnson & Towers was required to have a permit, and knew that Johnson & Towers
did not have a permit." Id.
146. 880 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1083 (1990).




the permit status of the facility is an element of the offense.14 9 To
date, the other federal circuits that have considered this issue have
chosen to follow the construction adopted by the Hoflin court. 5
With respect to the transporter provision of section 6928(d), how-
ever, the Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Speach,15' held that the
government must prove that the defendant had knowledge of a facil-
ity's permit status.151 Under the transporter provision, it is unlawful
to "knowingly transport[] or cause[] to be transported any hazard-
ous waste . ..to a facility which does not have a permit."'5 3 The
Speach court found that, unlike the facility operator, a transporter
of hazardous waste is not in the best position to know the facility's
permit status.154 This decision was consistent with an earlier deci-
sion by the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Hayes International
Corp.'55 In Hayes International, the court found that knowledge of
the permit status is required because the precise wrong that Con-
gress intended to combat was transportation to an unlicensed facil-
ity, and to otherwise remove the knowing requirement would
criminalize innocent conduct.'56 As an example of an innocent de-
fendant, the court alluded to the transporter who reasonably be-
lieves that a site has a permit but in fact has been misled by the
people at the site. 5
Although knowledge of the permit status is required under section
6928(d)(1), Hayes International made clear that the government is
not required to prove the defendant had knowledge of the permit
requirement.' 58 The court reasoned, consistent with International
Minerals, that where a transporter is dealing with hazardous mater-
149. Id. at 1038-39.
150. See United States v. Dean, 969 F.2d 187, 191-92 (6th Cir. 1992) (concluding that knowl-
edge of the permit requirement does not need to be proved), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1852 (1993);
United States v. Baytank (Houston), Inc., 934 F.2d 599, 613 (5th Cir. 1991) (concluding that
under § 6928(d)(2) the government need only prove factually that the defendant has no permit).
151. 968 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1992).
152. Id. at 796-98.
153. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(1).
154. 968 F.2d at 796-97.
155. 786 F.2d 1499, 1503-04 (11th Cir. 1986).
156. Id. at 1504.
157. Id. In dicta, the First Circuit in United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co.
also seemed to favor this interpretation because it "would eliminate the danger of convicting some
hypothetical transporter who lacked information that the disposal facility was without the proper
license." 933 F.2d 35, 47-48 (Ist Cir. 1991). The court went on to note that "a person [] who
treat[s], store[s], or dispose[s] of hazardous wastes will obviously be better positioned than at
least some transporters to know what materials a particular permit covers." Id. at 48.
158. Hayes Int'l, 786 F.2d at 1504-05.
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ials that pose a severe threat to public welfare, he can be presumed
to be aware of the regulatory scheme. 159 Therefore, under the trans-
porter provision, knowledge of the permit status is required but
knowledge of the permit requirement itself is not.
4. Knowledge That Materials Are Hazardous Wastes
The final question of construction is whether the term "know-
ingly" modifies "hazardous wastes" or, in other words, whether the
government must prove that the defendant knew that the materials
he handled were hazardous.160 Courts have agreed that knowledge
of the hazard is an element of the offense, but only to the extent
that the defendant was aware that the materials being handled had
the "potential" for harm to others or the environment.16' Therefore,
the government need not prove that the defendant actually knew
that the waste was hazardous within the meaning of the regulations.
Once again, the courts relied on International Minerals"6 2 to reach
this conclusion, whereby the defendant is presumed to be aware of
the regulatory scheme.'6 3 Consequently, as long as the defendant
has knowledge of the general nature of the materials and is not
159. Id. at 1502-03.
160. The term "hazardous waste" is defined under RCRA as:
[Al solid waste, or combination of solid wastes, which because of its quantity, concen-
tration, or physical, chemical, or infectious characteristics may - (A) cause, or sig-
nificantly contribute to an increase in mortality or an increase in serious irreversible,
or incapacitating reversible, illness; or (B) pose a substantial present or potential haz-
ard to human health or the environment when improperly treated, stored, transported,
or disposed of, or otherwise managed.
42 U.S.C. § 6903(5).
161. United States v. Baytank (Houston), Inc., 934 F.2d 599, 612-13 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding
that the word "knowingly" means no more than that the defendant knows factually that what is
being stored has the potential for harm to others or the environment, and it is not required that he
know that there is a regulation which says what he is storing is hazardous under RCRA); United
States v. Dee, 912 F.2d 741, 745 (4th Cir. 1990) (stating that the defendant does not have to
know "that regulations existed listing and identifying the chemical wastes as RCRA hazardous
wastes," but does have to know that chemicals in question are "hazardous" - inferentially ap-
proving the Hoflin and Greer definitions of "hazardous" as having "potential to harm others or
the environment"), cert. denied, I11 S. Ct. 1307 (1991); United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033,
1039 (9th Cir. 1989) (approving a jury instruction which stated that the defendant must know the
substance "had the potential to be harmful to others or to the environment"), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 1083 (1990); United States v. Greer, 850 F.2d 1447, 1450-52 (11 th Cir. 1988) (affirming an
instruction which stated that the defendant need only know that the chemical waste has the poten-
tial to be harmful to others or the environment); United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 786 F.2d
1499, 1502-05 (11th Cir. 1986) (stating that the defendant need not know "that the paint waste
was a hazardous waste within the meaning of the regulations").
162. 402 U.S. 558 (1971).
163. Id. at 564-65.
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under a mistaken belief that he is dealing with an innocuous sub-
stance (e.g., distilled water), he can be held criminally culpable."6 4
F. The Use of the Responsible Officer Doctrine to Impute
Guilty Knowledge Under Section 6928(d)
As the preceding discussion demonstrates, the courts interpret the
"knowing" requirement broadly in order to effectuate its regulatory
purpose as a public welfare statute. This has decreased the prosecu-
tor's burden of proof so that the government may successfully prose-
cute a corporate officer based only on her knowledge of facts and
circumstances, rather than knowledge of the regulatory scheme.'
Even with this relaxed burden, however, federal prosecutors argue
that it is difficult to prove corporate officers had actual knowledge of
a RCRA violation because they often shield themselves from crimi-
nal liability by delegating "hands-on" responsibilities to
subordinates. 166
To address this problem, aggressive prosecutors advocate the use
of the responsible corporate officer doctrine under section
6928(d). 67 As discussed before, the doctrine serves to satisfy the
knowledge requirement by allowing the fact-finder to infer guilty
knowledge based on a corporate officer's position of responsibility.168
Therefore, a defendant can be completely unaware of any facts or
circumstances resulting in the offense but still be criminally liable
since he should have known of the offense given his responsible posi-
tion in the corporation. 6 9 Whether the RCO doctrine can be ap-
plied to RCRA's knowledge requirement has been left to the courts
to decide under general legal principles.' 70 The courts have not been
completely consistent, however, in the manner in which they have
164. Id. No federal circuit court has yet been confronted with a case in which the defendant
knew of the chemical but did not know it has the "potential to be harmful to others or the envi-
ronment." However, in dicta, the Baytank court suggested that a finding that the defendant knew
that the regulations listed it as a hazardous waste under RCRA might both be required and
sufficient. 934 F.2d at 613 n.25.
165. See, e.g., Baytank. 934 F.2d at 612-13.
166. See Barrett & Clarke, supra note 11, at 883.
167. Id.
168. See supra notes 80-112 and accompanying text (discussing the RCO doctrine).
169. See supra notes 81-104 and accompanying text (discussing the application of the RCO
doctrine in Dotterweich and Park).
170. See supra notes 108-12 and accompanying text (discussing the Report on the Conference
Committee on the 1980 RCRA amendments on the issue of applicability of the RCO doctrine to
the criminal penalties section).
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exercised this authority. In United States v. MacDonald & Watson
Waste Oil Co., 171 the First Circuit expressly held that the RCO doc-
trine may not be applied to section 6928(d) of RCRA.' 72 Although
no decision has explicitly held otherwise, two other circuit court de-
cisions, United States v. Dee' and United States v. Baytank
(Houston), Inc.,174 implicitly upheld the use of the doctrine.'7 5
1. United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co.
In United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co.,17 6
D'Allesandro, the president and owner of MacDonald & Watson,
was convicted under section 6928(d) of RCRA.177 The company had
a valid permit to transport and dispose of waste oils and soils con-
taminated with nonhazardous wastes on property known as the Poe
Street Lot. 78 D'Allesandro, however, was convicted of transporting
and disposing of toluene-contaminated soil (a listed hazardous
waste) at the Poe Street Lot without the proper permit.' 79 Although
the prosecution had no direct evidence that D'Allesandro actually
knew of this shipment, there was evidence that he was a "hands-on"
manager of this relatively small firm.' 80 In addition, there was proof
that a consultant warned him on two earlier occasions that other
shipments of toluene-contaminated soil had been received from
other customers in violation of the permit. 8'
The First Circuit reversed D'Allesandro's conviction because the
district court incorrectly charged the jury regarding the element of
knowledge in the case of a corporate officer.' 82 The court instructed
the jury as follows:
When an individual Defendant is also a corporate officer, the Government
may prove that individual's knowledge in either of two ways. The first way
is to demonstrate that the Defendant had actual knowledge of the act in
171. 933 F.2d 35 (Ist Cir. 1991).
172. Id. at 55; see infra notes 175-87 and accompanying text (discussing the facts and holding
of MacDonald & Watson).
173. 912 F.2d 741 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 11I S. Ct. 1307 (1991).
174. 934 F.2d 599 (5th Cir. 1991).
175. See infra notes 188-215 and accompanying text (discussing the facts of Dee and Baytank).
176. 933 F.2d 35 (Ist Cir. 1991).
177. Id. at 39.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 42.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 50-51.
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question. The second way is to establish that the defendant was what is
called a responsible officer of the corporation committing the act. In order to
prove that a person is a responsible corporate officer three things must be
shown.
[1] it must be shown that the person is an officer of the corporation, not
merely an employee.
[2] it must be shown that the officer had direct responsibility for the activi-
ties that are alleged to be illegal. Simply being an officer or even the presi-
dent of a corporation is not enough. The Government must prove that the
person had a responsibility to supervise the activities in question.
And [3] . . . the officer must have known or believed that the illegal activity
of the type alleged occurred. 88
The MacDonald & Watson court found that this instruction did
more than simply permit a jury to decide whether to infer knowl-
edge from relevant circumstantial evidence.184 Instead, the court felt
it created a "mandatory" presumption of guilty knowledge based on
proof that a responsible corporate officer knew or even erroneously
believed that illegal activity of the same type had occurred on an-
other occasion.185 The court reasoned that application of the RCO
doctrine is limited to misdemeanor offenses under public welfare
statutes that impose no scienter requirement. 88 Thus, the court re-
fused to apply the doctrine to a felony provision of RCRA that has
a knowledge requirement and carries possible imprisonment of five
years and, for a second offense, ten. 87 The First Circuit reversed
D'Allesandro's conviction and held that "[i]n a crime having knowl-
edge as an express element, a mere showing of official responsibility
. . . is not an adequate substitute for direct or circumstantial proof
of knowledge. '"188
183. Id. The court noted that the third element as phrased seemed ambiguous at first glance
because it could be read to require actual knowledge of the illegal activity. Id. at 51. However,
because the district court earlier instructed the jury on actual knowledge, the First Circuit decided
it was meant to convey only what it literally said: "D'Allesandro must have known or believed
that illegal shipments of the type alleged had previously occurred." Id. (second emphasis added).
This tied into the evidence that D'Allesandro had been advised on two earlier occasions that other
shipments of toluene-contaminated soil had been received from other customers in violation of the
permit. Id.
184. Id. at 52.
185. Id. at 53.
186. Id. at 51-52.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 55. The court did note, however, that willful blindness to facts constituting the
offense may be sufficient to establish knowledge. Id.
At least one district court has also refused to allow the government to use the RCO doctrine as
a means of satisfying the knowledge requirement. In United States v. White, four individuals and
PureGro, Inc., their employer, were charged with violations of RCRA and the Federal Insecticide,
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2. United States v. Dee
In United States v. Dee,189 the Fourth Circuit affirmed the convic-
tions of three individuals, Dee, Lentz, and Gepp, who were civilian
engineers of the U.S. Army assigned to the Chemical Research, De-
velopment, and Engineering Center (Center) at Aberdeen Proving
Ground in Maryland. 9 ° The defendants were involved in the devel-
opment of chemical warfare systems. 9' They were responsible for
ensuring that the provisions of RCRA were fulfilled within their de-
partments and that their subordinates were aware of and in compli-
ance with those regulations.' 92 Gepp was responsible for the plant's
daily operations.' 93 Dee and Lentz were high-ranking managers who
were aware of the storage problems, but neither personally super-
vised the treatment, storage, or disposal of hazardous waste nor in-
volved himself with daily activities at the plant. 94
Dimethyl polysulfide was a chemical that was placed in drums
and stored at the Center after a canceled weapons program elimi-
nated the chemical's usefulness.' 96 Lentz and Gepp failed to move
the drums from a storage plant even though they were warned by a
safety inspector that the plant's roof might collapse.' 96 The roof ulti-
mately did collapse, and the drums were crushed, causing the di-
methyl polysulfide to leak into the floor drains.'97 Several months
passed before the defendants responded to the spill, even though em-
ployees had complained of noxious odors. 98
The government prosecuted all three defendants for RCRA viola-
tions. Even though Dee and Lentz were not aware of the daily waste
Fungicide and Rodenticide Act. 766 F. Supp. 873 (E.D. Wash. 1991). The individuals loaded a
tank of waste pesticide materials and rinseates onto a truck and sprayed them on a field, presuma-
bly to kill insects. Id. at 877. The defendants, including one corporate officer, were charged with
conspiring to violate RCRA and with storing, transporting, and disposing of hazardous waste
without a permit. Id. The government argued that the corporate officer should be criminally liable
for the actions of all his employees because he knew, or should have known, of their actions by
virtue of his position of responsibility. Id. at 894-95. The court held that "[t]he 'responsible corpo-
rate officer' doctrine would allow a conviction without showing the requisite specific intent .
[Ilt is 'knowing,' not 'should have known' as the prosecution suggests." Id. at 895.
189. Dee, 912 F.2d 741 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 1307 (1991).
190. Id. at 743.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 744.
193. See Barrett & Clarke, supra note 11, at 865 (discussing the factual background of Dee).
194. Id. at 870.






disposal and storage activities of the plant, the government secured
their convictions by convincing the district court to instruct the jury
on the RCO doctrine.' 9 The instruction read as follows:
Among the circumstances you may consider in determining the defend-
ant's knowledge are their positions in the organization, including their re-
sponsibilities under the regulations and under any applicable policies. Thus
you may, but need not, infer that a defendant knew facts which you find
that they should have known given their positions in the organization, their
relationship to other employees, or any applicable policies or regulation.
[A]s managers ... , defendants may be found guilty ...if you find that
the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:
First, that each defendant has a responsible relationship to the violation.
That is, that it occurred under his area of authority and supervisory
responsibility.
That each defendant had the power or the capacity to prevent the viola-
tion. That each defendant acted knowingly in failing to prevent, detect or
correct the violation. 00
Based on this instruction, the defendants may have been convicted
because they "should have known," given their positions and respon-
sibility, that the Center was failing to prevent, detect, or correct the
RCRA violations.
This instruction would, therefore, seem to allow convictions based
on a negligence standard of liability. The prosecutors in this case,
however, contended that the defendants were not convicted for mere
negligence because the district court properly emphasized that the
defendant must have knowingly acted or failed to act.201 Neverthe-
less, language in the Dee decision suggests that the defendants may
have, in fact, been convicted based on their negligent conduct.20 2
The court stated that "[n]egligent and inept storage of hazardous
wastes is one of the evils RCRA was designed to prevent, and
§ 6928(d) makes such egregious conduct a crime." 203 This state-
ment brings into question whether the Fourth Circuit, in considering
the appeal, actually found knowledge to be a requirement at all.
199. See Barrett & Clarke, supra note 11, at 884-85.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 885-86.




3. United States v. Baytank (Houston), Inc.
In United States v. Baytank (Houston), Inc.,2"4 the Fifth Circuit
broadly interpreted the knowledge requirement. In so doing, the
court implicitly applied the underlying theory of the RCO doctrine
without specifically acknowledging its use.2"' The government prose-
cuted Baytank, a company that deals in chemical transfer and stor-
age, and three individual employees for violations of various envi-
ronmental statutes.20 6 Two of these employees, Baytank's executive
vice president and its operations manager, were found guilty under
RCRA for knowingly storing hazardous wastes in drums and tanks
without a permit.2 07 The district court, however, acquitted the two
defendants, and the government appealed."'
The Fifth Circuit reversed the acquittals, relying heavily on the
corporate officer's intimacy with, and responsibility for, Baytank's
storage operations and their involvement with environmental compli-
ance efforts.20 9 According to the court, these factors provided suffi-
cient evidence to connect the two defendants with the violations.21
The court stated:
There was evidence that during the periods covered by those counts both
individuals were intimately versed in and responsible for Baytank's opera-
tions. Johnsen, as Operations Manager, had direct responsibility for most of
the facility's day-to-day operations, including the filing of environmental
compliance forms. Nordberg, as Executive Vice President, also was involved
in the operations and had submitted the application for an NPDES permit
under the Clean Water Act. The testimony was sufficient to allow the con-
clusion that both Nordberg and Johnsen knew of the storage of hazardous
wastes in violation of the requirements for storage without a permit. Given
the evidence of their detailed knowledge of and control over the storage op-
erations at Baytank, the jury was entitled to conclude that they participated
in the illegal storage charged .... "I
Under Baytank, then, the government may not have to explicitly
argue for the application of the RCO doctrine if it can persuade the
courts to apply the doctrine implicitly through the use of circum-
204. 934 F.2d 599 (5th Cir. 1991).
205. Id. at 616-17; see Onsdorff & Mesnard, supra note 16, at 10,103-04.
206. Baytank, 934 F.2d at 599.
207. Id.
208. Id.






In sum, this Background section has demonstrated that by char-
acterizing a violation of RCRA as a "public welfare offense," the
federal circuit courts limited the mens rea requirement to knowl-
edge of facts and circumstances, instead of requiring knowledge of
the regulatory scheme.21 3 This has significantly reduced the prosecu-
tor's burden of proof. Even so, prosecutors have attempted to utilize
both the willful blindness doctrine and the RCO doctrine.214 These
doctrines satisfy the mens rea requirement under section 6928(d)
without proof of actual knowledge of material elements of the crime
by allowing jurors to infer knowledge based on circumstantial evi-
dence.2 15 The use of these doctrines, however, has raised some con-
cern that they may effectually lower the "knowing" standard of lia-
bility prescribed by Congress, so that individuals may be convicted
for conduct that is, at worst, negligent.2"' The following analysis
considers the legitimacy of these concerns.
II. ANALYSIS
Protecting human health and the environment is a legitimate and
desirable objective of the federal government. Prosecuting corporate
officers for crimes committed against the environment no doubt
plays a significant role in achieving this objective. Moreover, be.-
cause corporate officers have primary decisionmaking authority, the
deterrent function that is the goal of environmental criminal en-
forcement is better served by actions against them. Therefore, it is
important that upper-level employees not be allowed to insulate
themselves from guilty knowledge by delegating "hands-on" respon-
sibilities to subordinates. On the other hand, it would be grossly un-
fair to convict and imprison a corporate officer who was neither
aware of the truth nor deliberately avoided learning the truth about
a RCRA violation. Although the officer may have been negligent,
212. See Onsdorff & Mesnard, supra note 16, at 10,104 ("In Baytank, the Justice Department
apparently applied the doctrine implicitly, presumably under the guise of circumstantial evidence,
and the government was successful.").
213. See supra notes 117-33 and accompanying text (discussing generally the knowledge
requirement).
214. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text (discussing the government's advocacy of
both the willful blindness doctrine and the RCO doctrine).
215. See supra notes 53-112 and accompanying text (discussing generally the willful blindness
and RCO doctrines).
216. See supra note 16 and accompanying text (pointing out the concern that merely negligent
conduct may satisfy the knowledge requirement through the use of these doctrines).
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reckless, or just plain stupid, Congress requires that he commit the
offense "knowingly" to be culpable. 17
The willful blindness doctrine was developed in criminal jurispru-
dence to deal with these competing concerns."1 This section there-
fore suggests both that proper application of the willful blindness
doctrine does not offend the knowledge requirement and that Con-
gress intended its use with respect to section 6928(d). In contrast,
however, this Comment argues that crimes requiring knowledge do
not provide the proper context for application of the RCO doctrine.
The RCO doctrine requires a lower evidentiary showing that not
only discourages the use of the willful blindness doctrine, but also
creates a negligence, if not strict, liability standard for corporate
officers.2"9
A. The Proper Use of the Willful Blindness Doctrine Is
Consistent with the Knowledge Requirement
The obvious defense to a criminal charge under section 6928(d)
of RCRA is that the defendant lacked the knowledge required
under the provision. A corporate officer might establish such a de-
fense if he consciously avoided learning whether activities delegated
to subordinates resulted in illegal conduct. The willful blindness
doctrine was conceived in criminal jurisprudence to deal with this
type of unfair practice.2 Under the doctrine, positive knowledge of
an offense is not required.2 Instead, the defendant is considered
equally culpable for his deliberate ignorance.22 Thus, under this
doctrine, a jury may infer guilty knowledge from evidence that the
defendant's suspicions were aroused but that he consciously avoided
learning of illegal activity.
If the evidence at trial does not support an inference of willful
blindness, however, the judge must refrain from using the instruc-
tion. Otherwise, the judge creates a substantial risk that the jury
will infer guilty knowledge on the basis of mere negligence. 2 3 For
instance, consider a situation where a defendant who is responsible
217. See supra notes 42-54 and accompanying text (discussing the "knowing" mental state).
218. See supra notes 55-79 and accompanying text (discussing the willful blindness doctrine).
219. See supra notes 80-113 and accompanying text (discussing the RCO doctrine).
220. See generally United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697 (9th Cir.) (affirming the willful blind-
ness doctrine when deliberate ignorance was present), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 951 (1976).
221. Id. at 700.
222. Id.
223. See United States v. Lara-Velasquez, 919 F.2d 946, 951-52 (5th Cir. 1990).
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for the overall operation of a large waste disposal facility is unaware
that a subordinate employee allowed a customer to illegally dump
hazardous waste. Assume that at trial, the government does not pre-
sent evidence indicating that the defendant's suspicions were
aroused or that he avoided learning of the illegal dumping. But as-
sume further that the government does convince the jury that a rea-
sonable person in the defendant's position should have known of the
illegal dumping. Under these circumstances, the jury might improp-
erly conclude that since the defendant should have known of the
illegal activity, his lack of awareness must have been the result of
deliberate ignorance. Thus, the jury will have inferred knowledge
based on an objective negligence standard of liability, rather than
from circumstantial evidence that tends to prove actual awareness.
To safeguard against this indiscriminate use of the willful blind-
ness doctrine, courts should use the threshold test to determine the
appropriateness of the instruction. Under this test, two inferences
must be raised by the evidence at trial: 1) the defendant was subjec-
tively aware of a high probability of the existence of the illegal ac-
tivity; and 2) the defendant purposely contrived to avoid learning of
the illegal activity.22" ' As discussed earlier, the first prong of this test
is derived from the Model Penal Code, and acts to avoid convictions
of merely negligent defendants by requiring evidence of subjective
awareness. 25 Therefore, it would not be enough for the government
to merely present facts that tend to support an inference that a rea-
sonable person would have known of the illegal activity. Instead, the
facts must tend to support an inference that the defendant was actu-
ally aware of a high probability of the illegal conduct. For example,
in the Dee case, the two corporate officers, Dee and Lentz, admitted
that they were aware of the storage problems at the Aberdeen Prov-
ing Ground. 228 Based on this evidence, a jury might properly infer
that the two defendants were actually aware of a high probability
that the dimethyl polysulfide was being improperly stored. If so, the
first prong would be satisfied.
Once this first prong is established, the same evidence is likely to
satisfy the second prong of the test as well. More specifically, when
224. Id. (citing United States v. Alvarado, 838 F.2d 311, 314 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied. 487
U.S. 1222 (1988)); see supra notes 71-79 and accompanying text (discussing this threshold test).
225. See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text (discussing the purpose of the first prong of
this threshold test).




a defendant is aware of a high probability of illegal activity, a fail-
ure to question the suspicious circumstances suggests that he pur-
posefully contrived to avoid guilty knowledge.227 For instance, once
the government established that Dee and Lentz were aware of a
high probability that the dimethyl polysulfide was being improperly
stored, they could point to the defendants' failure to investigate and
remedy the illegal storage as suggestive of an intent to remain igno-
rant of the violation. This second prong cannot be ignored, however,
because it is possible that a defendant could actively question or
investigate suspicious circumstances, but not actually come to know
of the illegal activity. Therefore, before a court gives a willful blind-
ness instruction, the facts must tend to support the inference that
the defendant's ignorance was purposeful and not merely the result
of unfruitful inquiries or the deceptive practices of others.
Where both prongs of this threshold test are satisfied, the jury
should be instructed on the willful blindness doctrine in cases
brought under section 6928(d) of RCRA. As the foregoing analysis
demonstrates, proper application of the doctrine avoids the risk of
convicting merely negligent or innocent defendants. Moreover, use
of the willful blindness doctrine ensures that prosecutors can effec-
tively convict corporate officers under section 6928(d). Use of this
doctrine provides a legal device for prosecuting upper-level employ-
ees who attempt to shield themselves from criminal liability by con-
sciously avoiding guilty knowledge.
Most importantly, however, the applicability of this doctrine to
RCRA is what Congress seems to have intended. 228 As discussed
earlier, reporting on the 1984 amendments of section 6928(d), the
House Judiciary Committee explicitly stated that "[t]he term
'knowing' includes the concept of 'willful blindness.' "229 The Com-
mittee Report emphasized that it wanted knowledge to include will-
ful blindness "so that it will not be possible for someone to avoid
criminal responsibility by deliberately remaining ignorant about the
material conditions and requirements of permits and of interim sta-
tus regulation. '230 This clear expression of legislative intent should
227. Lara-Velasquez, 919 F.2d at 952; see supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the second prong of this threshold test).
228. HR. REP. No. 198, supra note 62, at 9, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5644 (discuss-
ing congressional intent regarding the willful blindness doctrine).
229. Id. Unlike the willful blindness doctrine, the Committee Report makes no mention of the





B. The RCO Doctrine Is Inconsistent with the Knowledge
Requirement
As much as the proper use of the willful blindness doctrine is con-
sistent with the mens rea requirement of section 6928(d), the very
nature of the RCO doctrine causes it to be incompatible with stat-
utes requiring knowledge. The RCO doctrine, as it was conceived in
Park, placed an affirmative duty on responsible corporate officers
not only to prevent, but also to seek out and remedy violations that
threaten public health and welfare.231 This is essentially a strict lia-
bility concept in the sense that once responsibility is established, the
defendant's mental state has no bearing on criminal liability. The
MacDonald & Watson court correctly reasoned that because the
RCO doctrine was established in respect to public welfare statutes
with no scienter requirement, the very nature of the doctrine as-
sumes that no inquiry into knowledge - actual or constructive - is
necessary.232 Moreover, the RCO doctrine originated in the context
of misdemeanor crimes and was to some extent premised on "the
historic conception [that] a 'misdemeanor' makes all those responsi-
ble for it equally guilty . ... "33 There is no similar justification
for failing to give effect to the knowledge requirement under
RCRA, especially since the crime imposes harsh felony sanctions
carrying possible imprisonment for up to ten years.
In addition, applying the RCO doctrine to RCRA will cause cor-
porate officers to be subject to these harsh criminal sanctions as a
result of conduct that is, at worst, negligent. As evidenced by the
jury instruction given in Dee, a jury can infer knowledge where a
corporate officer "should have known," given his position and re-
sponsibility, that his company was failing to prevent, detect, or cor-
rect a RCRA violation."" Despite the prosecutors' contrary conten-
tions, this instruction by its very language encourages the jury to
posit criminal liability based on a defendant's negligence. To secure
a conviction, the government needs only to convince the jury at trial
231. United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 672 (1975); see supra notes 83-105 and accompany-
ing text (describing Dotterweich and Park as providing the foundation for the RCO doctrine).
232. United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co., 933 F.2d 35, 51-52 (Ist Cir.
1991); see supra notes 182-88 and accompanying text (noting that when knowledge is an express
element of the crime, application of the RCO doctrine is inadequate).
233. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 281 (citation omitted).
234. See Barrett & Clarke, supra note II, at 884-85 (providing the text of jury instructions).
1494 [Vol. 42:1461
"WILLFUL BLINDNESS"
that a reasonable person in the defendant's position "should have
known" of the RCRA violation. Thus, this instruction permits the
jury to infer knowledge based on an objective negligence standard of
liability, rather than from circumstantial evidence that tends to
prove knowledge.
Perhaps the most convincing evidence that the doctrine imposes a
negligence standard of guilt is the comment made by the Dee court
in affirming the defendants' convictions. The court stated that
"[niegligent and inept storage of hazardous wastes is one of the
evils RCRA was designed to prevent, and § 6928(d) makes such
egregious conduct a crime. ' 35 Since the court itself is confused over
the appropriate level of culpability, jurors can hardly be expected to
preserve the elusive concept of mens rea under a RCO instruction.
In summary, because the RCO doctrine was developed under
statutes with no mens rea requirement, crimes requiring knowledge
simply do not provide the proper context for the doctrine's applica-
tion. As a result, use of the doctrine fails to give effect to the knowl-
edge requirement that Congress has expressly included under sec-
tion 6928(d). Instead, defendants are susceptible to criminal
conviction by virtue of what they should have known as a responsi-
ble corporate officer, regardless of whether they were actually aware
of any facts or circumstances that led to the crime. This creates a
negligence standard of liability for corporate officers under RCRA
that was not intended by Congress.
C. The Willful Blindness Doctrine Should Be the Sole
Prosecutorial Device Against Corporate Officers Who Shield
Themselves from Criminal Liability
As discussed above, proper application of the willful blindness
doctrine avoids the risk of convicting merely negligent defendants,236
but at the same time provides an alternative way of convicting cor-
porate officers who shield themselves from guilty knowledge by dele-
gating "hands-on" responsibilities to subordinates. Moreover, Con-
gress approves of its use under section 6928(d) . 31 The willful
blindness doctrine, however, will not become the dominant
prosecutorial device for convicting corporate officers under RCRA
235. United States v. Dee, 912 F.2d 741, 747 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, III S. Ct. 1307
(1991).
236. See supra notes 54-79 and accompanying text (discussing the willful blindness doctrine).
237. HR. REP No. 198, supra note 62, at 9, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5644.
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unless courts diligently refuse to apply the RCO doctrine either ex-
plicitly or, as in cases such as Dee and Baytank, implicitly. This is
because the evidentiary showing necessary to convict a corporate of-
ficer under the RCO doctrine is much less than is required under
the willful blindness doctrine.
Under the RCO doctrine, prosecutors only need to present evi-
dence that the defendant held a position of responsibility, allowing
the jury to infer from that evidence that the officer should have
known of the RCRA violation. 238 Therefore, prosecutors do not have
to prove that the defendant had personal knowledge of any facts or
circumstances that resulted in the RCRA violation. In comparison,
proper application of the willful blindness doctrine would require
prosecutors to prove the defendant had personal knowledge of facts
and circumstances in order to establish that the defendant was sub-
jectively aware of a high probability of illegal activity. 239 Therefore,
the willful blindness doctrine's subjective standard of guilt is more
difficult to prove than the RCO doctrine's objective standard and
thus requires a higher evidentiary showing.
Given this disparity, the practical effect of the RCO doctrine is to
render the willful blindness instruction superfluous. As a result, not
only is the RCO doctrine's use inconsistent with the knowledge re-
quirement because it creates a negligence standard of liability, but
it further undermines the effective use of the willful blindness doc-
trine. Since Congress has endorsed the willful blindness doctrine
under section 6928(d), the explicit or implicit application of the
RCO doctrine undermines this congressional intent.
CONCLUSION
By following the reasoning in International Minerals, the federal
circuit courts limited the mens rea requirement of section 6928(d)
to knowledge of facts and circumstances, rather than requiring
knowledge of the regulatory scheme. These decisions significantly
reduced the government's burden of proof. Even with this relaxed
burden, however, prosecutors argue that use of the RCO doctrine is
necessary to convict corporate officers who insulate themselves from
culpability by delegating "hands-on" responsibilities to subordi-
238. See supra notes 80-113 and accompanying text (discussing generally the applicability of
the RCO doctrine as a basis for criminal liability).
239. See supra notes 54-79 and accompanying text (discussing generally the willful blindness
doctrine).
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nates. Unfortunately, this argument ignores that the willful blind-
ness doctrine was conceived in criminal jurisprudence to deal with
this very type of unfair practice. Moreover, the proper application of
the willful blindness doctrine is consistent with both the knowledge
requirement of section 6928(d) and congressional intent. In con-
trast, the RCO doctrine was developed under the provisions of the
FDCA, which have no scienter requirement. As a result, the doc-
trine is not consistent with the mens rea requirement of knowledge
under section 6928(d) of RCRA. Moreover, the doctrine requires a
lower evidentiary showing that not only discourages the use of the
willful blindness doctrine, but also creates a negligence standard of
liability for corporate officers which was not intended by Congress.
Stefan A. Noe

